The paper investigates whether there is a causal link between poverty or low education and participation in politically motivated violence and/or terrorist activities. After presenting a discussion of theoretical issues, we review evidence on the determinants of hate crimes, which are closely related to terrorism. This literature finds that the occurrence of hate crimes is largely independent of economic conditions. Next we analyze data on support for attacks against Israeli targets from public opinion polls conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in December 2001. These polls indicate that support for violent attacks does not decrease among those with higher education and higher living standards. The core contribution of the paper is a statistical analysis of the determinants of participation in Hezbollah militant activities in Lebanon in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The evidence that we have assembled suggests that having a living standard above the poverty line or a secondary school or higher education is positively associated with participation in Hezbollah. We also find that Israeli Jewish settlers who terrorized Palestinians in the West Bank in the early 1980s were overwhelmingly from high paying occupations. Although our results are tentative and exploratory, they suggest that neither poverty nor education has a direct, causal impact on politically motivated violence and terrorism. The conclusion speculates on why economic conditions and education are largely unrelated to participation in, and support for, terrorism.
Introduction
That investment in education is critical for economic growth, improved health, and social progress is beyond question. That poverty is a scourge that the international aid community and industrialized countries should work to eradicate is also beyond question. What is less clear, however, is whether poverty and low education are root causes of terrorism. This paper investigates whether there is a causal link between poverty or low education and support for terrorist activities and politically motivated violence.
In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11 Perhaps surprisingly, our review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment, by themselves, would meaningfully reduce international terrorism. Any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics. 1 After refraining from drawing a connection between poverty and terrorism for a time, on March 23, 2002 President Bush announced in Monterrey, Mexico, "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror." See Laura Tyson, "It's Time to Step Up the Global War on Poverty" Business Week, Dec. 3, 2001 , Richard Sokolsky and Joseph McMillan, "Foreign Aid in our Own Defense," New York Times Op-ed, An understanding of the causes of terrorism is essential if an effective strategy is to be crafted to combat it. Moreover, drawing a connection between poverty and terrorism if it is not justified is potentially quite dangerous as the international aid community may lose interest in providing support to developing nations when the imminent threat of terrorism recedes, much like support for development waned in the aftermath of the Cold War. And connecting foreign aid with terrorism risks the possibility of humiliating many in less developed countries, who are implicitly told they only receive aid to prevent them from committing acts of terror. Furthermore, premising foreign aid on the threat of terrorism could create perverse incentives in which some groups are induced to engage in terrorism to increase their prospect of receiving aid. In our view, alleviating poverty is reason enough to pressure economically advanced countries to provide more aid than they are currently giving.
To make any headway investigating the determinants of terrorism, one must have a working definition of terrorism. This is a difficult task. More than 100 diplomatic or scholarly definitions exist. The types of activities by various groups considered terrorist acts differ substantially across the definitions. The term terrorism has also evolved over time. When first used in a political context during the French Revolution, the term was reserved for accusations against those who, like Robespierre, made use of violence in the name of the state. By the late 19 th Century, however, Russian and French anarchists proudly used the term terrorism to describe their violent endeavors against the state. Part of the difficulty in defining terrorism is that there are valid disputes as to which party is a legitimate government. During World War II, for example, the German occupation February 12, 2002, and George McGovern, " The Healing in Helping the World's Poor," New York Times Op-ed, January 1, 2002. forces labeled members of resistance groups as terrorists. "One man's terrorist," the saying goes, "is another's freedom fighter." There are a range of possible definitions. On the one hand, the U.S. State Department, which acknowledges that no single definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, seems to capture what is considered terrorism by many governments and international organizations. Since 1983, the State Department has employed the following definition for statistical and analytical purposes:
The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
The State Department also specifies that "the term noncombatant is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. … We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or elsewhere." The rub, of course, is that the definition of "subnational" and "military hostilities" leaves much latitude for disagreement.
On the other hand, definitions used by scholars tend to place more emphasis on the intention of terrorists to cause fear and terror among a target audience with the aim of persuasion that transcends the harm caused to the immediate victims. Scholarly definitions often also include nation states as potential perpetrators of terrorism.
Rather than dogmatically adhere to one definition, we analyze involvement in, or support for, activities that, at least when judged by some parties, constitute terrorism.
Nevertheless, in the incidents analyzed in our paper the line between terrorism and resistance is often blurred; indeed, in the case of Hezbollah in the 1980s we think it is fair to say that terrorism was a tactic sometimes used in resistance against an occupying force. A similar statement could be made about Palestinian militance. At the least, however, all of the cases we examine could be thought of as involving politically motivated violence. Therefore, it is reassuring that our main conclusions appear to hold across a varying set of circumstances, cultures and countries.
We do not examine state terrorism because we suspect the process underlying participation in state terrorism is quite different than the process underlying substate terrorism, and would involve a different type of analysis. We do not dispute, however, that state terrorism exists, and has at times generated substate terrorism as a response.
In the next section we provide an overview of theoretical considerations involved in the decision to participate in terrorist-type activities. As is conventional in economics, involvement in terrorism is viewed as a rational decision, depending on the benefits, costs and risks involved from engagement in terrorism compared to other activities. Not surprisingly, the standard rational choice framework does not yield an unambiguous answer to the question of whether higher income and more education would reduce participation in terrorism.
Evidence on the determinants of terrorism is just beginning to be assembled. The second section of our paper considers evidence on "hate crimes," which we argue can be viewed as a close cousin to terrorism in that the target of the offense is selected because of his or her group identity, not their individual behavior, and because the effect of both is to wreak terror in wider audience than those directly affected. A consensus is emerging in the social science literature that the incidence of hate crimes, such as lynchings of African Americans or violence against Turks in Germany, bears little relation to economic conditions. The third section considers data from a public opinion poll conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR).
In December 2001, Palestinians were asked whether they support attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets, and about whether they considered certain events acts of terrorism. We report breakdowns of the data by education and occupation. These results indicate that support for violence against Israeli targets is widespread in the Palestinian population, and at least as great among those with higher education and higher living standards as it is among the unemployed and illiterate.
The fourth section contains the main new contribution of our paper, a statistical analysis of the determinants of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon. We analyze a sample of data that combines information on 129 members of Hezbollah who were killed primarily while involved in paramilitary actions in the late 1980s and early 1990s with a general population survey of similarly aged individuals in Lebanon. We find that education and poverty are statistically insignificant predictors of whether individuals become martyrs for Hezbollah. Indeed, having a standard of living above the poverty line or a secondary-school education or higher is positively associated with participation in Hezbollah. The results are consistent with the biographical evidence assembled for Palestinian suicide bombers.
The fifth section presents a summary of the backgrounds of 27 Israeli Jews who were involved in terrorist activities in the Occupied Territories in the early 1980s. These individuals, who planted bombs and attempted to assassinate Palestinian mayors, are remarkably well educated and drawn from well paying occupations.
In the sixth section we present an analysis of the incidence of major terrorist acts (cited in the International Encyclopedia of Terrorism) over time in Israel. Specifically, we relate the number of terrorist acts each year to the rate of economic growth in that year or in the recent past.
The data on participation and support for political violence, militance and/or terrorism that we examine are meager, often indirect, and possibly nonrepresentative. In addition, participation in terrorist activities may be highly context-specific, and we only examine terrorism, militance and politically motivated violence in a small number of settings primarily in the Middle East. Consequently, our results must be considered tentative and exploratory. Nonetheless, we are not aware of compelling evidence that points in the opposite direction from what we have found. In light of our results and the literature, we would urge intellectuals and policy makers to exercise caution in presuming that poverty and education have a direct, causal impact on terrorism.
Theoretical Considerations of Participation in Terrorism
A simple view of terrorism is that participation in terrorism is akin to participation in crime in general. Economists have a well worked out and empirically successful theory of participation in criminal activities. As emphasized by Becker (1968) , individuals should choose to allocate their time between working in the legal job market or working in criminal activities in such a way that maximizes their utility. After accounting for the risk of being caught and penalized, the size of the penalty, and any stigma or moral distress associated with involvement in crime, those who receive higher income from criminal activities would choose involvement in crime. In this model, crime increases as one's market wage falls relative to the rewards associated with crime, and decreases if the risk of being apprehended after committing a crime or the penalty for being convicted of a crime rises.
Available evidence suggests that individuals are more likely to commit property crimes if they have lower wages or less education. The occurrence of violent crimes, including murders, however, is typically found to be unrelated to economic opportunities.
3 Landes (1978) and Sandler, et al. (1983) apply the economic model of crime to transnational terrorism. They focus on how an increase in penalties and law enforcement influences the incentive to partake in terrorist activities. The economic model, however, yields few concrete predictions insofar as the relationship between market opportunities and participation in terrorism is concerned because participation in terrorist acts by individuals with different characteristics depends on the probability that participation will bring about the desired political change, and the differential payoff for the various groups associated with achieving the terrorists' desired aims versus the penalties associated with failure. For example, it is possible that well educated individuals will disproportionately participate in terrorist groups if they think that they will assume leadership positions if they succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the terrorist organization than less educated individuals.
Other important considerations include the relative pay of skilled and unskilled individuals for participation in terrorist organizations and how it compares to relative pay 2 See, for example, Ehrlich (1973) , Freeman (1996), and Piehl (1998) . 3 See, for example, Piehl (1998) and Ruhm (2000) .
in the legal sector, and the selection of terrorists by terrorist organizations from the pool of potential applicants. Keller (2002) reported that Iraq decided to increase the payment to families of suicide bombers from $10,000 to $25,000 in March 2002 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the month after that decision, suicide bombings increased, although it is unclear whether the connection is causal.
Even before the increase in the payment to families of suicide bombers, Nasra Hassan (2001) reported that there was an excess supply of willing suicide bombers.
Between 1996 and 1999, Ms. Hassan, a relief worker for the U.N., interviewed nearly 250 militants and associates of militants involved in the Palestinian cause, including failed suicide bombers, the families of deceased bombers, and those who trained and prepared suicide bombers for their missions. With a queue of willing participants, how do terrorist or militant groups choose their suicide bombers? A planner for Islamic Jihad explained to Ms. Hassan that his group scrutinizes the motives of a potential bomber to be sure that the individual is committed to carrying out the task.
5
A high level of educational attainment is probably a signal of one's commitment to a cause and determination, as well as of one's ability to prepare for an assignment and carry it off, so the stereotype of suicide bombers being drawn from the ranks of those who are so impoverished that they have nothing to live for may be 180 degrees off base. This interpretation is also consistent with another of Ms.
Hassan's observations about suicide bombers:
None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires.
Suicide bombers are clearly not motivated by the prospect of their own individual economic gain, although it is possible that the promise of larger payments to their families may increase the willingness of some to participate in suicide bombing missions. We suspect their primary motivation instead results from their passionate support for the ultimate aims and desires of their movement. Nassra Hassan, for example, reported, "Over and over, I heard them say, 'The Israelis humiliate us. They occupy our land, and deny our history.'" Eradication of poverty and universal high school education are unlikely to change these feelings. Indeed, it is even possible that those who are well off and well educated perceive such feelings more acutely. Economic theory is unlikely to give a very convincing answer one way or the other as to whether poverty or education are important root causes of terrorism. One could construct plausible explanations for why a reduction in poverty and a rise in education might increase or decrease the incidence of terrorism. Next we turn to a broad consideration of evidence related to terrorism.
5 Ms. Hassan also observed that the terrorist groups generally reject for suicide bombing missions "those who are under eighteen, who are the sole wage earners in their families, or who are married and have family responsibilities." 6 Observe, for example, that well educated and high-income people are consistently more likely to vote than are less educated and poor people. If the primary payoff motivating people to join and support terrorist
Evidence from Hate Crimes
Because the literature on participation in terrorism is less well developed than the literature on "hate crimes," we begin by briefly reviewing evidence on the economic determinants of hate crimes, a phenomenon that many have considered closely related to terrorism (e.g., Hamm, 1998 and Kressell, 1996) . Hate crimes are commonly defined as crimes against members of religious, racial or ethnic groups because of their group membership, rather than their characteristics or actions as individuals. Hate crimes include acts of violence, as well as destruction of property, harassment and trespassing.
Until recently, social scientists thought economic deprivation was a crucial determinant of hate crimes. New evidence, however, strongly challenges the empirical basis for this conclusion. A landmark study by Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) overturns that conclusion.
First, they showed that the correlation between lynchings and economic conditions vanished once secular trends in both variables were taken into account. That is, apart from the long-term tendency for the number of lynchings to decline and the economy to grow, lynchings were unrelated to year-to-year economic fluctuations. Second, when they use Simon Kuznets's measure of real per capita GNP growth (which was unavailable to Raper) as a measure of economic conditions instead of the price of cotton, they find that lynchings and economic conditions are virtually uncorrelated.
Third, and most important, Raper's sample ended just before the Great Depression. Lynchings did not rise during the Great Depression, despite the dramatic deterioration in economic conditions. When Green, Glaser and Rich extend the original sample through 1938, they find an insignificant correlation between the number of antiblack lynchings and the value of an acre of cotton, and a positive correlation between anti-black lynchings and real GNP growth. It is almost certainly the case that the inverse correlation reported between economic conditions and anti-black lynchings that launched the aggression-frustration hypothesis was spurious, a coincidence of two unrelated trends that happened to move in the opposite direction at the turn of the 20 th Century.
Moreover, the evidence of a connection between economic conditions and other types of hate crimes in contemporary data is also elusive. Green, Glaser and Rich (1998) report time-series evidence on the incidence of hate crimes against blacks, Jews, Asians and gay men and lesbians using data from New York City each month from 1987 to 1995. They found that the incidence of these crimes was unrelated to the city's unemployment rate.
Across regions in a given year, the occurrence of hate crimes and prevalence of hate groups are also found to be unrelated to economic circumstances of the area. Jefferson and Pryor (1999) , for example, examined determinants of the existence of hate groups across counties in the United States in 1997, using a list of hate groups assembled by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Specifically, they used logistic regressions to relate the characteristics of counties to the likelihood that the county was home to a chapter of a hate group. About 10 percent of the 3,100 counties in the continental United States contained one or more hate group, like the Klu Klux Klan. The existence of hate groups was unrelated to the unemployment rate, divorce rate, percent black, or gap in per capita income between whites and blacks in the county. The share of the adult population with a high school diploma or higher had a statistically significant, positive association with the probability that a hate group was located in the area. They concluded that, "economic or sociological explanations for the existence of hate groups in an area are far less important than adventitious circumstances due to history and particular conditions."
The findings for the United States do not appear to be unique. Germany experienced a rash of violence against foreigners in the early 1990's. Unemployment was high, particularly in the former East Germany. Krueger and Pischke (1997) , however, found no relationship between the unemployment rate and the incidence of ethnic violence across 543 counties in Germany, once they controlled for a dummy variable indicating whether the county was located in the former East or West Germany.
Likewise, average education and the average manufacturing wage in the county was unrelated to the amount of violence against foreigners. Within the former East Germany, those counties located furthest from the west had the highest incidence of ethnic violence.
Krueger and Pischke attribute the geographic pattern to a failure of law enforcement further east, and pent up animosity that was suppressed during Communism.
To summarize, neither cyclical downturns nor longer-term regional disparities in living standards appear to be correlated with the incidence of a wide range of hate crimes. This is not proof of the absence of a causal relationship, but if there were a direct causal effect one would expect hate crimes to rise during periods of economic hardship. Rather than economic conditions, the hate crimes literature points to a breakdown in law enforcement and official sanctioning and encouragement of civil disobedience as significant causes of the occurrence of hate crimes.
Evidence from Public Opinion Polls in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Although public opinion polls are subject to multiple interpretations, such data can Third, a majority of the Palestinian population did not consider suicide bombings, like the one that killed 21 Israeli youths at the Dolphinarium night club in Tel Aviv, terrorist events (Q22-5). Toward the end of the questionnaire, respondents were also asked whether they thought the international community considered the Dolphinarium bombing a terrorist event (not shown). Ninety-two percent responded yes. These results highlight differences in interpreting the meaning of the word terrorism.
Fourth, and important for our purposes, there is no evidence in these results that more 
Economic Expectations
It is possible to use public opinion data to infer trends in economic expectations. On 
Correlates of Participation in Hezbollah Militant Activities
The Hezbollah (or Hizb'allah, Party of God) was founded in Lebanon in 1982, following the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. The original goal of Hezbollah was to fight the Israeli occupation and create a Shiite state in Lebanon, modeled on Iran.
The organization refrained from publicly claiming responsibility for its actions for three years after it was formed, and did not reveal its name until 1985. Hezbollah has since evolved into a complex social, political and resistance organization, and currently posts a web site in English and Arabic (www.hizbollah.org) that describes its multifaceted activities. The organization has also renounced terrorism in the region.
Hezbollah is based in three main areas in Lebanon: Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has used various means to achieve its goals. In the 1980s, Hurvitz. Hurvitz (1998) used the data to develop a profile of Hezbollah, but did not compare the Shahids to the Lebanese population from which they were drawn. We culled a data set from the biographies that included the individuals' age at death, highest level of school attended, poverty status, region of residence, and marital status.
There are at least three problems with the data for our purposes worth emphasizing. If this is the case, then our sample may under represent highly educated members from middle or upper income families.
Third, relevant information was missing for several individuals, and sometimes we were forced to indirectly infer variables from available information. For example, we inferred poverty status from available information on individuals' family background (e.g., parents' occupation) or from their own economic condition when it was reported, but this information was available for fewer than half of all cases. We tried to define poverty in a comparable way to how it was defined in the general population survey described below, but we could only do so with partial information so the data may not be perfectly comparable.
Obtaining data on the general population in Lebanon proved to be difficult as well. A strength of the PHS data is that the sample is large, and the survey covers a period close to the time frame of the Hezbollah sample. One problem with these data, however, is that we were not provided the sex of individuals in the population sample. All of the deceased Hezbollah fighters were male. Although we readily acknowledge that this is a shortcoming of the data, we suspect it does not seriously influence our results because, as best we can ascertain, educational attainment is similar for male and female youth in the relevant cohorts in Lebanon. The following text table reports school enrollment at various ages for male and female Lebanese youth in 1996, based on Figuié (1998 Family poverty status, region of residence and age are also likely to be orthogonal to sex, so including data on young women in the sample without controlling for gender is unlikely to severely bias our estimates.
Despite the limitations of both data sets, the samples provide some information on the characteristics of Hezbollah militants vis-à-vis the general population. If nothing else, this exercise provides an illustration of the type of analysis that could be done to learn more about the characteristics of individuals who participate in organizations that use terrorist techniques.
Because the sample of 129 deceased Hezbollah fighters ranged in age from 15 to 38, we restricted the PHS sample to the 120,796 individuals age 15 to 38 as well. Fourth, the Hezbollah fighters tended to be in their late teens and early 20s when they died. Russell and Miller (1983) report that "the usual urban terrorist was between [age] 22 and 25" in their sample of more than 350 terrorists from 18 different organizations.
Fifth, the deceased Hezbollah fighters were more likely to reside in South Lebanon and Beirut than were members of the population. This finding is not surprising given that the south of Lebanon is a stronghold of Hezbollah, and was the area occupied by Israeli forces. Because educational attainment and living conditions are notably higher in Beirut than in the rest of Lebanon, it is important to try to control for regional differences in comparing the Hezbollah fighters to the general population. Concentrating on the weighted estimates, the results suggest that poverty is inversely related with the likelihood that someone becomes a Hezbollah fighter, and education is positively related with the likelihood that someone becomes a Hezbollah fighter. The former effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and the latter at the 0.10 level, when the equation excludes region dummies, but both coefficients become insignificant 9 To maximize the sample size, the mean value of nonmissing values was assigned to observations with missing data for each variable in the Hezbollah sample. This procedure is not ideal and has some undesirable properties (e.g., data may not be missing at random and the reported standard errors do not reflect the additional variability due to the imputations), but it provides a simple way to impute missing data. A more sophisticated technique would multiply impute missing observations along the lines proposed by Rubin (1987) . We hope to perform this kind of an analysis in the future.
when region is held constant in column (4). (The p-value for a joint test that poverty and education are unrelated to participation in Hezbollah in column (4) As suggested by the means in Table 4 , residents in Beirut and southern Lebanon are more likely to join Hezbollah. Also, even in the sample of 15 to 38 year olds, younger individuals are more likely to be represented in the deceased Hezbollah sample than in the population.
We regard these findings as suggestive but not definitive. First, data limitations prevent us from drawing strong conclusions. Second, the process of participation in Hezbollah, primarily a resistance organization, may not be representative of participation in other organizations that are more exclusively focused on terrorist activities.
Nevertheless, these findings provide little support for the view that those who live in poverty or have a low level of education are disproportionately drawn to participate in terrorist activities. It would be useful if future research could conduct this type of analysis for other groups and in other contexts.
Israeli Jewish Terrorists
In What were the biographical backgrounds of those involved in these violent attacks by Israeli Jewish extremists? Table 6 reports the name, birth year, occupation and nature of underground activity for 27 individuals involved in the Jewish Underground in the early 1980s. We think this list is fairly complete and accurate, as the main source is a book by Haggai Segal (1988), one of the members of the Underground. It is clear that these Israeli extremists were overwhelmingly well educated and in high paying occupations. The list includes teachers, writers, university students, geographers, an engineer, a combat pilot, a chemist, and a computer programmer. As Neff (1999) observed of the three men convicted of murder, "All were highly regarded, welleducated, very religious." Although we have not statistically compared the backgrounds of the extremists to the wider Israeli population, the group of individuals listed in Table 6 certainly does not appear to be particularly underprivileged or undereducated.
Time-Series Analysis of Terrorism in Israel
A deterioration in economic conditions over time may be associated with the likelihood of terrorist incidents, even if cross-family differences in education and living conditions are unrelated with participation in terrorism. Sandler and Enders (2001) examine time trends in the number of various forms of transnational terrorist events, but do not relate economic conditions to the number of terrorist attacks. To begin to fill this void, we briefly examined whether real GDP growth in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was related to the number of major terrorist incidents in Israel.
The number of major terrorist incidents each year was derived from the We interpret these results as providing mixed evidence as to whether terrorist attacks tend to increase or decrease with economic growth. Conducting this type of analysis on more countries and varying lag lengths, would be a useful exercise for future research.
Conclusion
The evidence we have assembled and reviewed suggests there is little direct connection between poverty, education and participation in terrorism and politically motivated violence. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that, compared with the relevant population, participants in Hezbollah's militant wing in the late 1980s and early 1990s were at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as they were to come from impoverished families without educational opportunities. We should caution, however, that the evidence we have considered is tentative due to data limitations. In addition, our focus has been primarily on the Middle East, so our conclusions may not generalize to other regions or circumstances.
Nevertheless, less quantitative studies of participants in a variety of forms of terrorism in several different settings have reached a conclusion similar to ours. We are particularly struck by Russell and Miller's (1983) In addition, poverty may indirectly affect terrorism through the apparent connection between economic conditions and the proclivity for countries to undergo civil wars. Fearon and Laitin (2001) find that GDP per capita is inversely related to the onset of civil war, and Collier and Hoeffler (2000) find that the growth rate of GDP per capita and male secondary school enrollment are inversely related to the incidence of civil war.
Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Sudan are high-profile examples of countries where civil war provided a hospitable environment for international terrorists to operate. There are other situations, however, where countries undergoing a civil war did not provide a breeding ground for international terrorism, so it is unclear how much one should extrapolate from the relationship between economic development and civil war. And terrorism has arisen in many countries that were not undergoing a civil war. Before too much is inferred about terrorism from the relationship between civil war and poverty, we think it would be useful for future research to directly examine the relationship between terrorist incidents and GDP at the national level, using similar cross-country analyses to those used in the literature on civil wars.
Enough evidence is accumulating that it is fruitful to begin to conjecture why participation in terrorism and political violence is apparently unrelated, or positively related, to individuals' income and education. The standard economic model of crime suggests that those with the lowest value of time should engage in criminal activity. But we would hypothesize that in most cases terrorism is less like property crime and more like a violent form of political engagement. More educated people from privileged backgrounds are more likely to participate in politics, probably in part because political involvement requires some minimum level of interest, expertise, commitment to issues and effort, all of which are more likely if people are educated and wealthy enough to concern themselves with more than mere economic subsistence. These factors could outweigh the effect of opportunity cost on individuals' decisions to become involved in terrorism.
The demand side for terrorists must be considered as well as the supply side.
Terrorist organizations may prefer highly educated individuals over less educated ones, even for homicide suicide bomb attacks. In addition, educated, middle or upper class individuals are better suited to carry out acts of international terrorism than are impoverished illiterates because the terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be successful. This consideration suggests that terrorists who threaten economically developed countries will disproportionately be drawn from the ranks of the relatively well off and highly educated.
On the whole, we conclude that there is little reason to be optimistic that a reduction in poverty or increase in educational attainment will lead to a meaningful reduction in the amount of international terrorism, without other changes. Stern (2000) 
